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Japanese Industrial Policy:
What Is It, and Has It Worked?
S. Linn Williams*
n 1840, the first spike for building the B&O Railroad was to be
driven, by coincidences, on the same day that the first shovel was to
be turned for building the C&O Canal. President John Quincy Adams
asked his advisers which event he should attend. He was advised to
attend the opening of the canal, because that was where the govern-
ment would undoubtedly stake its "industrial policy". John Carroll, of
Virginia, had the honor of driving the first spike of the B&O Railroad.
John Carroll has a town in Virginia named after him - Carroll-
ton. And John Quincy Adams has two towns in Massachusetts named
after him and his "industrial policy" - "Quincy" and "Marblehead".
To a generation of Americans raised after the war, Japan has be-
come identified with successful "industrial policy". This would have
surprised Edwin Reischauer, one of America's leading experts on Japan
and Ambassador there shortly after the war, when he wrote in 1951
that he doubted the Japanese economy could ever recover from the war
because of "structural defects" in Japanese education and industrial
organization.
It is also a surprise to me that Japan, rather than Europe, is driv-
ing the current debate in this country over an American "industrial
policy", when European "industrial policy" is older, better understood
and occurring in an environment more like our own. There are rela-
tively few people who know much about Japanese industrial policy, in-
cluding many who have written about it. Those who know something
about it differ sharply in their perceptions of how well it has worked,
and even of what it is, contributing to the haze of admiration, distaste
and mystery that surrounds the subject.
To make the situation more confused, there are other agendas at
play in the U.S. - protectionism and big government, to name two.
And there is always the temptation to attribute something one does not
understand to the peculiarities of Japanese "culture". Indeed, in order
to keep foreigners at a distance, Japanese officials themselves rein-
forced until recently the notion that "Japan is different".
* Partner, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C. Former Deputy United States
Trade Representative.
The following text was compiled from the transcript of the remarks made by Mr. Williams at
the Conference.
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I. INDUSTRIAL POLICY
"Industrial Policy" can cover a multitude of potential sins. The
current literature favors a broad definition, although, if any policy af-
fecting industry is an "industrial policy", one does not leave out much.'
I think the discussion of "Industrial Policy" would be more useful if
the definition were restricted to something like "targeting": the alloca-
tion of resources by the government to favored sectors, mostly as an
expression of economic nationalism. To get a feel for the issue as it
involves Japan, however, I think one has to use a broad definition. I
shall discuss macroeconomic policies, sectoral policies and, what I call,
structural policies.
Macroeconomic policies affect industries indiscriminately and indi-
rectly. These include things like saving rates, interest rates, education
and training, taxation and public infrastructure. Sectoral policies be-
stow special benefits on some industries and not others - including
import restrictions, loans and loan guarantees, subsidies and govern-
ment-funded research. Structural policies regulate, induce or tolerate
private business practices and become imbedded in the ways in which
businesses interact with one another and with the public. These include
things like antitrust, investment and shareholders' rights.
II. MACROECONOMIC POLICY
A. What is it?
Japanese macroeconomic policies have tended to support industrial
production over private consumption in an effort to create an environ-
ment favorable to all industry. Those biases were most effective in the
1950s and 60s, when the government had maximum control over the
economy. Although the government's tools are substantially reduced,
much of the government still has those biases and exercises them when
it can.2
Japanese macroeconomic policy has had several components. The
most important of which were keeping the public sector small, main-
taining low taxes, taxing consumption rather than income, designing a
financial system to get low-cost funds into banks and to industry, keep-
ing interest rates low, and supporting industrial infrastructure over im-
proved quality of life.
I A broad view of industrial policy also infers that Marx may have been right, and recent
events are supposed to have proven that Marx was wrong.
2 The recent "stimulus" packages primarily encourage industrial investment rather than pri-
vate consumption, by propping up land and stock asset values.
[Vol. 19:79 1993
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Government Sector
*During the high-growth period of the 1950s and 60s, the government
consumed only twenty percent of GNP (compared to thirty percent in
the U.S.), freeing up resources for private sector growth and keeping
the government from "crowding out" private investment during a pe-
riod of serious capital shortage.
eFor the past ten years, the public sector has consumed roughly thirty-
three percent of GNP; about the same as in the U.S. Although there
is pressure from business to reduce that percentage, it is unlikely to go
down because an increasingly older population will need to be taken
care of. The government has also run a surplus for ten-fifteen years,
adding to overall national savings rather than subtracting from it, as
in the U.S., but that trend may be changing after SHI and recent
"stimulus" budgets.
Tax Policy
*Japanese tax rates were low during the growth period of the 1950s
and 60s. Interest on savings was not taxed until recently and is taxed
now at a lower rate than other income; capital gains are still not
taxed.
*Credits and special allowances, however, have been less generous in
Japan than in other industrialized countries, including the U.S. Japa-
nese corporate tax rates are currently higher than those in the U.S. 3
Financial System
*When Japanese companies needed capital in the 1950s and 60s, they
looked to banks because of the underdeveloped state of the equity and
bond markets. Government policy directed private savings into bank
accounts at low cost by limiting the alternatives and skewed bank
loans away from the person sector by using the central bank's dis-
count rate.
*Financial controls have been substantially reduced, but not elimi-
nated. Cash and bank deposits still account for a much higher per-
centage of personal assets in Japan than in the U.S. Although this is
now probably attributable less to policy than to aversion to risk and
debt and to high capital outlays required for housing and education.
3 The bias for production over consumption remains, however. When the government wanted
money four years ago, it raised taxes on consumption, not income, and home mortgages and inter-
est on personal debts have never been deductible.
3
Willams: Japanese Industrial Policy: What Is It, and Has It Worked
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1993
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
Interest Rate Policy
*During the 1950s and 60s Japanese policy controlled interest rates at
levels that may or may not have been lower than rates in other coun-
tries, but were lower than supply and demand in Japan would have
decreed.
*International capital movements and interest rates have been largely
deregulated, and it is an excess of savings over investment that has
helped to keep interest rates generally low.
Education Policy
-The postwar educational system was developed to support the eco-
nomic needs of industry. The greatest contrast with the U.S. is
through high school. Japanese children go to school longer than
American children; they study more science and math; and they grad-
uate with a high standard of literacy and technical competence. On
the other hand, aside from some support for engineering during the
1960s and 70s, the system has provided little graduate education and
unrigorous undergraduate education, reflecting the strong role of cor-
porate training.
Public Infrastructure
-Spending on public infrastructure, or to use the politically correct
word, "investment", has been biased towards industry and away from
public amenities. Japan has fewer parks, roads, sewer systems and
other standard public infrastructure than most other industrialized
countries.
*That is changing and, ironically, it is now foreigners who want more
public expenditures on industrial infrastructure, like airports, that
could aid imports.
B. Has Macro Worked?
Whether macroeconomic policies have worked depends on the
meaning of "worked" and how much importance can be attributed to
the policies as contrasted to other factors.
Japan's macroeconomic policies have been, in the view of most
economists, the most important non-market factor in Japan's post-war
national growth because they enhanced a generally favorable business
climate for all industry. Savings rate have been consistently higher
than in other industrialized countries. Although, overall tax rates are
roughly the same as the pre-Clinton U.S. rates; a greater percentage
comes from taxes on consumption. Japan's literacy rate is among the
highest in the industrialized world, and its training programs are ri-
[Vol. 19:79 1993
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valed only by Germany's. Japan has run a current accounts surplus of
between one percent and two percent of GNP for almost a decade, and
its interest rates have been consistently lower than in other industrial-
ized countries, both due in some measure to appreciation of the Yen in
the mid-1980s.
On the other hand, public infrastructure still lags behind other in-
dustrialized countries, even though it is improving. Land prices are ex-
traordinarily high, and rising once again. The average Japanese house
is one-half the size of the average American house, and the standard of
living of the average Japanese is one-third lower than the standard of
the average American. Japanese policy did not prevent Japanese banks
from entering into billions of dollars' worth of non-performing loans.
The policy bias towards production over consumption reinforced
cultural values and has to some extent become imbedded in patterns of
behavior. Consumption still accounts for just over half of GDP in Ja-
pan, by contrast to about two-thirds of GDP in the U.S. and Europe,
even though there is growing public pressure to shift more of the coun-
try's GDP into consumption.
III. SECTORAL
A. What is it?
The principal focuses of Japanese sectoral industrial policy have
been restructuring, technological development in the field of "knowl-
edge intensive" industries and energy saving.
The government, mainly through Ministry of International Trade
and Industry ("MITI"), was able to direct sectoral development in the
1950s and 60s through an elaborate system of laws and regulations
governing foreign trade and international financial transactions. Offi-
cials had direct control over foreigri exchange and imports of raw
materials and capital equipment and, as a result, substantial influence,
if not control, over the level and direction of domestic industry. Gov-
ernment officials decided, based upon their interpretation of the na-
tional interest, which industries or, in some cases, which companies got
priority.
Quite by coincidence, that period of maximum government control
coincided with the most rapid period of growth in output and trade ever
recorded. Thus, Japanese industry enjoyed the double benefits of a rap-
idly expanding closed domestic market and a rapidly expanding open
world market.
By the mid-1970s, direct administrative control over foreign ex-
change and trade and investment policies designed for "infant indus-
tries" became unjustifiable, and pressures for behavior consistent with
developed country status, primarily from the U.S., began. There was
internal ferment within the government and within MITI; but, with the
5
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"shocks" of oil, exchange rates and soybeans, nothing much changed.
For similar reasons, the liberalization of Japan's capital markets and
capital account transactions began around 1967, but proceeded very
slowly.
MITI was reorganized during the period to include so-called hori-
zontal bureaus, covering broad policy areas, in addition to the tradi-
tionally powerful vertical, or industry, bureaus. The aim was to pro-
mote greater consistency within MITI and among ministries. More
important, for the longer term at least, were the formulation and publi-
cation of broad-based MITI plans for industrial shifts away from basic
manufacturing and towards so-called knowledge-intensive industries,
meaning those with higher capital per worker requiring and permitting
higher skills and ages. These plans were made public in various policy
papers or "visions" produced either by MITI or by public/private advi-
sory groups, most notably the Industrial Structure Council. There was
no effort to hide these "visions"; to the contrary, they were, by and
large, translated into English and discussed within the OECD
There is very little mystery about Japan's sectoral "industrial poli-
cies". They are relatively classic mercantilism. Europe uses them; so do
India, Brazil and Peru. The major tools available to implement sectoral
policies include subsidies, R&D assistance, lending, special tax benefits
and restrictions on foreign competition.
Subsidies
The Japanese government uses few direct subsidies. MITI's
budget, for example, has never been more than two percent of the total.
Even in shipbuilding and other substantial "restructuring," direct sub-
sidies were modest.
Research and Development
The Japanese government supplies only about thirty percent of Ja-
pan's R&D, by contrast to fifty percent in the U.S. and Europe.4 When
given, R&D subsidies have generally been more than matched by the
private sector, and have usually been directed towards generic, precom-
petitive research, not applications. It is normal procedure, however,
that, in strategic areas, and in accordance with long-term targets, the
responsible government agencies join with the main industrial compa-
nies to conduct joint research.
' Much of the U.S. R&D budget has been military, but that is not true in Europe.
[Vol. 19:79 1993
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Lending
"Fiscal Investment and Loan Program"
Rather than relying on bond issues to fund government expendi-
tures, Japan raises funds through a postal savings system. These and
some other funds, like government pensions, are funneled through the
Fiscal Investment and Loan Program ("FILP") to government institu-
tions or expenditures. FLIP is no small fund, with eighty percent in-
vested in housing-based infrastructure and small businesses; less than
three percent is invested in "industry", and that appears to be in "ba-
sic", not high-tech.
"Japan Development Bank"
The Japan Development Bank ("JDB") was established in 1954 to
support domestic industry. It does not disclose its loans to individual
companies, and some loans - to buyers in order to purchase robotics,
for example - reflect a sectoral policy. However, the studies do not
show a pattern of lending to new industries but rather to public infra-
structure and a limited number of industries that have been supported
since JDB was founded such as steel, petroleum and chemicals. Trans-
portation and public utilities, for example, received seventy percent of
JDB's funds in 1961, more than fifty percent in 1991. By contrast, ma-
chinery received four percent of JDBs funds in 1961, less than one
percent now. JDB's interest rates, moreover, must be higher than its
cost of funds (usually FILP); and for most of the 1980s and 90s, the
rate was equal to the long-term prime rate.
Tax Benefits
Thirty years ago, tax benefits, mainly accelerated depreciation,
were used to support "important industries". The robotics, semiconduc-
tor equipment and computer industries have benefitted recently from
special depreciation allowances. On the whole, however, Japan uses
fewer credits and special allowances than do other industrialized coun-
tries; and the list of tax beneficiaries now includes mostly social con-
cerns such as facilities employing the handicapped, for example, small
business and agriculture.
Restrictions on Imports and Foreign Investment
The studies show that import and investment restrictions have
been the most effective sectoral policy by far. It is not an overstatement
to say that, without protection of the domestic market in some fashion,
most sectoral targeting would not have worked. Import protection was
broad-based in the 1950s and 60s, and was steadily reduced thereafter.
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Reductions were timed to help some sectors, like machine tools, al-
though there is little evidence of a careful, pre-planned shift from ma-
ture to newly-emerging sectors.
Foreign investments still require approval by the Ministry of Fi-
nance ("MOF") and are still subject to special, discriminatory review
by the Japan Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC") for compliance with
the Anti-monopoly Act. MOF has not rejected an investment in twenty
years, but the JFTC's review has been used to improve the position of
the Japanese party.
B. Has Sectoral Worked?
Although any single measure may have only a small impact, no
one can deny that, taken as a whole, Japanese sectoral policies have
been important to the development of some industries. On balance,
however, the most that can be said is probably that sectoral policies
have had positive effects on Japan's overall industrial structure, which
is not much different from that of other countries. Moreover, whether
the policies were "successful" depends upon what one means by "suc-
cess", and it is difficult to identify the extent to which sectoral policies
affected even a given sector let alone the economy as a whole. For ex-
ample, I would think that "success" would require an industry to be-
come free-standing after a period of sectoral policy; if the industry re-
quires more-or-less continuous subsidies or protection, it is hard to
argue that the sectoral policies have been a "success".
If "success" means jobs, it is true that Japan's official unemploy-
ment rate is low, and workers in many sectors - distribution, steel,
shipbuilding, computers, semiconductors, machine tools - may owe
their jobs at least in part t6 sectoral policies. But Japanese have also
kept roughly half the population, women, out of the workforce. It is
generally conceded that compensation is relatively low overall and that
underemployment is high in office jobs and in the distribution, service
and retail sectors. Also, it is sectoral policies that actually caused over-
capacity that later resulted in the loss of jobs in steel, shipbuilding, coal
and oil, and this may also come to pass in computers and
semiconductors.
If "success" means wages, it is true that the average Japanese
earns, by some measures, more than the average American now; and
some sectors, like shipbuilding and steel, have been artificially propped
up. But the standard of living of the average Japanese is also one-third
lower, in part because of high prices engendered by sectoral policies.
If "success" means export markets, Japan has been very success-
ful. But Japan's two leading export industries, automobiles and elec-
tronics, owe relatively little to sectoral policies apart from import re-
strictions in the 1960s. In fact, MITI pressured the Japanese
automobile industry to merge into a single company, actively opposed
[Vol. 19:79 1993
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Honda's entry into autos and thought Sony's electronics ideas a dead
end.
If "success" means technology, Japan has, again, been very suc-
cessful. But it is not at all clear that Japanese sectoral policies have
been responsible. Many Japanese sectoral policies for "high-tech" sec-
tors have been failures and even those considered "successful" are
probably better described as "mixed". Of six high-tech sectors targeted
by MITI during the 1970s - pharmaceuticals, office automation, semi-
conductors, aircraft, satellites and computers - four have been out-
right failures, and the jury is still out on computers and
semiconductors.
MITI targeted aircraft thirty years ago, but Japanese industry has
been able to produce only one unsuccessful commercial transport. As a
result, MITI is now simply encouraging Japanese participation in inter-
national consortia.
Over the past ten years or more Japanese computer and semicon-
ductor companies have owed much more to design, cost and quality
control than they have to sectoral policies. But both industries certainly
owe much of their early establishment and success to sectoral policies.
The Japanese government funded R&D, provided tax incentives and
lease financing, realigned companies in order 'to prevent "unnecessary
competition" and most importantly, protected them from foreign com-
petition in their early years through tariffs, quotas, investment restric-
tions and licensing requirements.
After almost twenty years of industrial policy, Japanese computer
products have little demand outside the sheltered domestic market, and
Japanese semiconductor companies may be trapped in the high-cost,
low-margin end of the market. U.S. companies dominate world markets
in computers and recently took back the lead in world markets in semi-
conductors. Even in Japan, American companies have between thirty-
five percent and fifty percent of the private mainframe market and, led
by aggressive price-cutting, have recently taken significant market
share in personal computers. Moreover, most industry analysts believe
that the key to the future of the computer industry is with software,
which American companies continue to dominate despite yet another
targeting by MITI. The so-called fifth generation project, for example,
which was to produce "artificially intelligent" computers after its ten-
year targeting, has fallen far short of its objectives, produced no funda-
mental technical advances or marketable products and is now being
phased out. Japanese semiconductor companies invested heavily in cap-
ital-intensive, high-volume products, which they lead. They also lead in
enhancements of those products by miniaturization and the use of new
materials. But they are being chased from behind by the Koreans, and
American companies are now back in the market, perhaps more as a
defensive measure, but still there. Also, there is only so much one can
9
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put on a chip, whatever the material, and American companies have
clear leads in software logic and enhancers, said to be the way of the
future for the industry, and dominate the microprocessor market.
The Japanese government targeted High-Definition Television
twenty-five years ago. In 1991 and more than one billion dollars later,
NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corp.) shoved the world's first working sys-
tem into operation. It now appears, however, that Japan's analog tech-
nology is inferior to digital technology developed by an American con-
sortium last year. Digital technology that has been accepted by Europe,
grudgingly, for its "industrial policy" was also working on an analog
system, as the standard for its industry.
As an aside, I recall that, at the beginning of the Bush Adminis-
tration in 1989, we were told that we had to invest $1.5 billion right
away, or HDTV and its spinoffs would be lost forever. I was told last
year in a study group, by the small company that developed the digital
technology, that it would not have been included in the group that
would have received the U.S. government's $1.5 billion, and, more im-
portantly, would not have tried to develop the digital alternative if the
U.S. had invested in the analog system as requested.
Sectoral "readjustment" policies for heavy industries have been no
more "successful" on the whole than the high-tech sectoral policies.
Japanese steel is a world leader, but sectoral policies for the oil and
chemical sectors were costly and ineffective. The Japanese national
railway lost five times as much per passenger as any other railway
before it was privatized. Shipbuilders have become virtual wards of the
state, surviving principally on the Japanese market, in which purchases
are funded by the JDB.
IV. STRUCTURAL
A. What is it?
"Structural" policies have regulated, induced or tolerated the way
businesses relate to one another and the way government relates to in-
dustry. The principal structural policies concern antitrust, investment
and the administrative procedures of the government. The effect of
structural policies has been to tolerate collusion and lack of
transparency.
Antitrust, Investment
Historically, the most effective sectoral policy has been restricting
foreign competition. Formal restrictions are now low, but foreign com-
petition is still restricted. This suggests continuing old-style industrial
policy, but is probably the imprint of structural policies on private be-
havior, particularly in the areas of antitrust and investment.
Japanese antitrust laws, although similar to those of the U.S. and
[Vol. 19:79 1993
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Europe, are weaker, and their enforcement has been, by international
standards, ineffective. This structural policy reinforces patterns of be-
havior. Routine meetings among competitors, often with the govern-
ment, to discuss forecasts, set policy, agree on regulations and the like,
create a climate in which collusion is tolerated more than it would be in
other industrialized countries.
Although, as noted, there are few formal restrictions on investment
in Japan, when the capital markets were liberalized in the 1970s the
government encouraged cross-shareholding as a structural way of pre-
empting foreign ownership of Japanese companies. Partly for that rea-
son, and partly for reasons of private preference, only about twenty-five
percent of the shares of companies listed on the Tokyo stock exchange
are actually traded; the rest are held by so-called "safe shareholders". 5
Lack of Government Transparency
Government policy is routinely made by "administrative guidance"
that is not public, accountable or appealable. Ministries can, and do,
delay or even deny licenses, information or other assistance unrelated
to the issue at hand, in order to impose "industrial policy" on unwilling
companies, mostly Japanese. Three successive advisory groups have
recommended greater transparency, in the form of a U.S.-style admin-
istrative procedure act, but to no avail. It is highly unlikely that this
form of "structural industrial policy" could be effective if the govern-
ment's actions were held to an international standard of transparency.
B. Has Structural Worked?
It is impossible to prove widespread illegal collusion. One can say,
however, that investigations and penalties for antitrust violations in Ja-
pan lag far behind those of other industrialized countries, and there are
numerous complaints by American and European companies of an-
ticompetitive practices and restricted markets.
Foreign investment in Japan is inhibited by a number of things
that have nothing to do with government policy, high cost being the
most obvious, but structural policies have had some effect in minimiz-
ing foreign investment. The U.S. is host to thirty-five percent of the
World's foreign direct investment, Europe to forty percent and Japan
to less than one percent. Japanese companies make lower profits and
pay out a lower percentage of them in dividends, without fear of effec-
tive shareholder dissatisfaction.
' Cumulative voting and other shareholder protections were phased out or made optional at
about the time the capital markets were liberalized, again reducing the incentive to buy into
Japanese, and one's influence if one does.
11
Willams: Japanese Industrial Policy: What Is It, and Has It Worked
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1993
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
V. CHARACTERISTICS
What are some of the lessons one can extract from Japanese in-
dustrial policies?
1. Market Factors are More Important Than Industrial Policy
High levels of economic growth were the most significant factor in
the development of Japanese industry. Japanese macroeconomic poli-
cies enhanced that growth but did not create it; and the oil shocks that
worked their way through the Japanese system in the 1970s, for exam-
ple, had far greater impact on Japanese industry than the government's
sectoral policies for energy conservation.6
Japanese industry also owes more of its recent success to its own
efforts at training, inventory control, management-labor relations, qual-
ity control and industry-funded R&D, and to cultural values of hard
work, community support and education.
2. The Japanese Economy is not Centrally Planned
Although Japanese bureaucracies are more powerful and indepen-
dent than U.S. bureaucracies, the economy is not centrally controlled.
A sectoral policy is developed by one agency to protect "its" constitu-
ents, and a campaign is then waged against other bureaucracies, partic-
ularly the Ministry of Finance, to bring the policy into effect. Indeed,
one cannot understand Japan at all until one understands that the prin-
cipal motivating force in any Japanese bureaucracy is its relationship to
other Japanese bureaucracies. One astute "popular" observer of Japan
noted that the problem of Japanese bureaucracy was not that there was
too much central control, but that there was too little. The last thing
that Japanese government wanted in the mid-1980s, for example, was a
massive dumping of semiconductors into the U.S. market, but they
were powerless to stop it.
The Economic Planning Agency, a serious agency of very good
economists, does produce long-range plans, but it would be unrealistic
to attach too much importance to them. They tend to be devised to fit
reality, rather than the other way around; moreover, a review of all six
post-war plans gives comfort to those who worry that Japan plans too
well.
3. Japan is "Industry Friendly"
Business considerations are routinely given priority in Japan. Reg-
ulatory agencies have often seen themselves as protecting the regulated
I Initial rises in energy prices were passed along to consumers much more quickly than in the
U.S., and companies themselves instituted sweeping energy conservation measures.
[Vol. 19:79 1993
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industry more than the consumer. Although social and health con-
sciousness is growing, product liability, handicapped access, striker
replacements, and until very recently, environmental protection, are
done in a more business-oriented way than in the U.S. As another ex-
ample, the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board just required
that U.S. banks book their assets at market value;. Japanese accounting
authorities delayed a similar rule, allowing banks to continue to book
their assets at historical cost.
4. The "Successes" of Sectoral Policy Have Been in Catching
Up, Not in Breaking New Ground
This is not to say that Japanese can copy but cannot create - I do
not think that is accurate anyway - but to say that the government is
much more likely to be able to play an effective role in copying than it
is in creating. Sectoral policies for automobiles, computers and semi-
conductors, for example, can be considered, at least in part, "suc-
cesses", and those policies were, not to put too fine a point on it, to
copy and make better. By contrast, sectoral policies for the "fifth gen-
eration" project, HDTV and software were "greenfield", and were
failures.
5. Protection of the Domestic Market from Foreign Competition
was the Most Effective Sectoral Policy
It may come as a disappointment to the new industrial policy types
that the most effective sectoral policy was an old mercantilist one. But
the studies show that this was the most significant government policy in
the development of the Japanese computer and semiconductor indus-
tries, and the only significant one in the automobile industry. The fail-
ure of two high-profile targeted sectors, aircraft and satellites, can be
explained by the fact that they were not protected against foreign com-
petition. Basically, Japanese buyers would not wait to buy the domestic
aircraft, and Japanese manufacturers could not compete despite other
industrial policies. Domestic production of satellites virtually disap-
peared, despite R&D and other sectoral policies, when governmental
and quasi-governmental entities were no longer required to buy
Japanese.7
I As an aside, when I negotiated the agreement that ended the target program for satellites
in 1990, two of my most important constituents were NTT and NHK, quasi-government entities
that wanted to buy the better, less expensive American satellites, as their private sector competi-
tors were doing.
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6. Cooperation and Consensus are Uniquely "Japanese" Charac-
teristics of Japanese Industrial Policy
Japanese companies and Japanese industry and government have
shown a unique capacity to act cooperatively. This is partly cultural
and partly the imprint of other industrial policy. When the Japanese
government engages with industry in "forecasts" of supply and de-
mand, for example, and in extensive consultations before a new law or
regulation is proposed, Japanese companies have some assurance that
they and their competitors are operating from the same premises, even
though not compelled or even asked to. Similarly, consultation and con-
sensus-building intend, by their nature and through the lengthy proce-
dures involved, to create a climate in which all concerned agree on
objectives and their implementation. Formal laws and regulations are
more likely to follow this process than to precede it, and to provide the
supportive framework rather than to assert direct influence.
Japanese companies, with or without the government, routinely co-
operate to fund basic R&D up to a certain level - something that
many students of American business have been encouraging American
businesses to do. Until very recently, most American companies, even
when the law permits, have been reluctant to enter into ventures with
their competitors.8
7. Japanese Industrial Policy has had its Cost
Japanese industrial policies have been implemented at the expense
of start-up and smaller Japanese companies, the Japanese consumer
and foreign exporters and investors. Companies have been coerced or
jawboned into combining, becoming part of a Keiretsu or getting out of
product lines. "Rich Japan, poor Japanese" has become a Mantra
among Japanese Salarimen and housewives, who now question, polls
show, the fairness and wisdom of an "industry friendly" environment.
The global trading system is also under the greatest strain it has
experienced since the war, much of that a reaction against Japanese
industrial and trade policy. As noted, absent a protected market, Japa-
nese industrial policy would almost certainly have failed; but the global
system cannot tolerate increases in external trade barriers, and must
actually begin to reduce internal ones.
8 Recent joint ventures by automobile, computer and semiconductor companies, however,
may signal a change in that attitude.
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